Transfers of Future Property by Wislizenus, Frederick A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1 Issue 4 
January 1916 
Transfers of Future Property 
Frederick A. Wislizenus 
St. Louis Bar Association 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frederick A. Wislizenus, Transfers of Future Property, 1 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 277 (1916). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vo.Published by the Undergraduates of the No.Vol. I ~ Washington University Law SchoolNo4
TRANSFERS OF FUTURE PROPERTY
I.
1. Various theories, slightly related, have been applied to
the decision of questions arising under the attempt to transfer
property not existing at the time of the transfer, and the blending
of the discussion of these theories in the decisions leads to no little
obscurity. This article is not a treatise on the subject of transfers
of future property, but rather an attempt at an analysis of the
questions involved and their relations to. each other, introductory
to specific investigation.
2. "Future property" is here used somewhat arbitrarily,
(suggested by the use of "future goods" in the Sales Acts), to in-
clude only the property in which the transferror has no legal interest
at the time of the transaction. It excludes all cases where the
transferor at the time has a right in the property which the law
recognizes, however unlikely it may be that his chance ever mater-
ialize. If the thing transferred is a contingent remainder, it is
outside our topic, though the chance of vesting be infinitessimal.
A devise to A in fee, to pass to B in fee whenever B travels around
the earth in ten days, gives B a present interest of however little
value, recognized in the law, and is not future property. On the
other hand, should the only child of an insane man convey his
interest in his father's estate during the life time of the latter
questions arising under the conveyance would concern future prop-
erty, for though the child's chance of inheriting is very strong, it
does not constitute a present interest in the legal sense.
3. The future goods may not be in existence at the time of
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the transaction, as in case of a crop not yet planted, or the unborn
young of animals. The goods may be existent at the time of the
transaction, but the transferror may then have no interest in them.
The transferror may agree to acquire a specific thing, a tract of
land, a horse, a claim against a third person, and to give it to the
transferee at some future time. The agreement may contemplate
future acquisition of goods of a certain kind, without reference to
specific goods, in which case it is a matter of indifference whether
or not the goods are in physical existence at the time of the agree-
ment. A contract for future delivery of grain to be acquired by
the vendor is an illustration; so also a provision in a mortgage cover-
ing property which may be substituted for what is specifically des-
cribed. The coming into existence of the future goods may be
wholly contingent. A sale of a prospective catch of fish before the
fishermen leave port is an illustration; so an assignment of a chance
of obtaining something either under will or ab intestato from a liv-
ing person; and an employe's transfer of unearned wages. The
discussion includes, as some of the foregoing illustrations show
the transfer of choses in action not in existence at the time of the
agreement.
4. The non-existence of the future property, or of any in-
terest therein in the assignor thereof, at the time of the transfer,
raises the problem common to all the situations coming under our
topic. But wholly apart from this consideration, there are classes
of cases where entirely independent matters of public policy inhibit
the transfer of such property. An enumeration of such situations
calling for consideration of special public policies, excluding them
from the main topic, will simplify the examination of the latter.
II.
5. Public Officers' Salaries. Pablic officers cannot make valid
assignments of salaries or fees before they are due and payable.
The reason given is that "if the emoluments of the office might
be separated from it and transferred to another, it would leave
the duties of the office as a barren charge to be borne by the in-
cumbent. It is evident that transfers of this kind would not tend
to promote activity and care in the discharge of official obligations."
In the matter of Worthington, 141 N. Y. 9.
Illustrative cases-assignment by a clery in U. S. Treasury.
Bliss vs. Lawrence. 58 N. Y. 442 '(1874), reviewing prior
cases; English and American.
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By a clerk of a court: Field vs. Chipley. 79 Ky. 260. By
a mail-carrier: State vs. Williamson, 118 Mo. 146. By a
sheriff: Bank vs. Wilson, 9 L. R. A. 706 (1890). By a retired
army officer: Schuenk vs. Wychoff. 46 N. J. Eq. 560.
By an executor of an estate: In re Worthington, supra.
6. This public policy does not extend to future wages in
private employment. "It is argued that such contracts (assign-
ments of future wages) "are so much against public policy that
they Qught not to be supported, but we think they are rather bene-
ficial, and enable the poor man to obtain credit when he could not
otherwise do it, and that too, without detriment to the creditors."
Smith vs. Atkins, 18 Vt. 461.
Mabin vs. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, sustains the holding in full
opinion, and is followed in Chicago R. R. vs. Provolt, 42 Colo. 103.
Some states have, however, enacted statutes prohibiting the
assignment of future wages, (which it may be remarked, though
outside our topic, have been held constitutional, e. g.. Internatonal
Text Book Company vs. Weissinger, 160 Ind. 349; Hteller vs. Lutz.
254 Mo. 704.). The foregoing deals only with public policy as to
assignment of unearned salary or wages. When we deal with the
general problem of transfer of non-existent property, we shall recur
to the special case of salary and wages as viewed under that aspect.
7. Assignment of Contracts. If the assignor attempts to as-
sign not merely future earnings under a contract, but further rights
thereunder, another question is presented. If A, the owner of a
vineyard is under contract with B to deliver the grapes raised thereon
for ten years to come to B, B being under obligation to accept them
and pay a stipulated price, it would seem at least questionable that
C as purchaser of the vineyard and assignee from A of that con-
tract with B, could hold B for breach of contract when he refused
to accept grapes raised by C. Yet such was the holding in La Rue
vs. Groezniger, 84 Cal. 281. The general rule is that when the con-
tract involves the personality of a party, his skill, knowledge, or
solvency, the contract is not assignable. The difficulty lies in
applying the test. So the assignment of an option to buy real
estate has been upheld. Rice vs. Gibbs, 33 Nebr. 460. The assign-
ment of a right to a piano to be selected by the purchaser, 41 Vt.
533. The assignment of a contractor who had engaged to sink an
oil well for defendant was enforced by the assignee in Galey vs.
Mellon, 172 Pa. St. 443. The owner of a house, who had a con-
tract for putting a heating plant into it, could assign the right under
the contract to the purchaser of the house in Voight vs. Murphy,
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164 Mich. 539. Se-, also King vs. Grocery Co., 72 Wash. 132,
Levarand vs. Farrington, 124 Minn. 110. On the other hand when
an Ice Company assigned its written contract with defendant for
delivery of ice, it was held the assignee could not recover at law
though he had delivered as per contract, Boston Ice Co. vs. Potter
123 Mass. 30. So the contracts were held personal, and therefore
not assignable in Arkansas Smelting Co., vs. Belden, 127 U. S. 388
and in A. M. Wooden Co. vs. R. R., 82 Iowa 735.
The topic of assignment of contracts is mentioned here with-
out attempting a full discussion merely to segregate the numerous
cases on the subject from our discussion of assignments of future
property.
8. Option Deals. A contract for. delivery of goods at a future
date at a fixed price with an agreement between the parties that
the goods shall not be delivered, but the contract adjusted by pay-
ment of the difference between the price agreed and the market
price at the date for what is called delivery in the contract, is clearly
a wager. On the other hand if the parties contemplate actual
delivery when the contract is made, it is not a wager, and a subse-
quent adjustment on the basis of difference in market price does
not make it so. The test is thus stated in Harvey vs. Merrill, 150
Mass. 1.
"If it is agreed by the parties that the contract shall be per-
formed according to its terms, if either party requires it, and that
either party shall have a right to require it, the contract does not
become a wagering contract because one or both of the parties intend
when the time for performance arrives, not to require performance,
but to substitute therefor a settlement by the payment of the dif-
ference between the contract *price, and the market price at the
time. Such an intention is immaterial except so far as it is made
part of the contract, although it need not be made expressly a part
of the contract. To constitute a wagering contract it is sufficient,
whatever be the form of the contract, that both parties understand
and intend that one party shall not be bound to deliver the mer-
chandise and the other to receive it and pay the price, but that
the settlement shall be made by the payment of the difference in
prices."
"In England it is held that the contracts, although wagers,
were not void at common law, and that the statute had not made
them illegal, but only non-enforcible, while generally in this country
all wagering contracts are held to be illegal and void as against
public policy." Irwin vs. Miller, 110 U. S. 499. (510).
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As an historical fact, it may be remarked that Lord Tenter-
den believed that any agreement for sale of goods which the vendor
intended to go into the market and buy was, without any further
element, a wagering contract; and emphatically so held in Bryan
vs. Lewis, Ry. M. 386-1826; but the decision was specifically
overruled in Hibblethwaite vs. McMorine, 5 M. & W. 462, (1839),.
since when the law has been as above stated.
The question whether or not an option contract constitutes
a wager belongs appropriately to a discussion of the general law
of wager.
9. Post-Obits. An assignment of the chance of obtaining
an interest either under will or ab intestato in the estate of a living
person presents in typical form the questions inherent in all trans-
fers of future property, and in that aspect comes up later for dis-
cussion. But on independent grounds this special class of trans-
fers may be attacked, as in their nature against public policy. On
one hand, the transaction is apt to be a fraud on the ancestor, whose
property goes into strangers' hands without his consent, or per-
haps even knowledge. Again, the effect on the assignor is very apt
to be bad. "Heirs, who ought to be under reasonable advice and
direction of their ancestor, who have no other influence over them
than what arises from a fear of his displeasure, from which the
heirs may be induce, to live industriously, virtuously, and pru-
dently, are, with the aid of money speculators, let loose from this
salutary control, and may indulge in prodigality, idleness and vice,
* * * Certainly the policy of the law will not sanction a trans-
action of this kind, from a regard to the moral habits of the citizens."
Parsons, C. J., in Boynton vs. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112 (121). The
decided preponderance of authority both in England and in this
country refuses to recognize the public policy as sufficiently strong
to void all such transactions indiscriminately, but enforces them
where they are shown to be fair, imposing, however, on the claimant
under the assignment the burden of showing such fairness.
Steele vs. Frierson, 85 Tenn. 430; Hoyt vs. Hoyt, 61 Vt.
413; Kuhn's Estate, 163 Pa. St. 438; Taylor vs. Swafford, 122 Tenn.
303; Bridge vs. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493; Estate of Wickersham, 138
Cal. 361.
Indeed, where there are unfair elements (e.g., excessive interest)
the Court, rejecting them, is ready to enforce the assignment for
what is fairly due. Martin vs. Marlow, 65 N. C. 695. Against the
weight of authority Kentucky holds that public policy prohibits
all assignments of chances in the estate of a living person. McCall
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
vs. Hampton, 98 Ky. 166; Hall vs. Hall, 153 Ky. 382; Spears vs.
Spaw, 118 S. W. 275. In Indiana, while the bare possibility of
upholding such a conveyance is somewhat grudgingly admitted
it is held that it is always a fraud on the ancestor unless made with
his consent. McClure vs. Rabe, 125 Ind. 139; and that too, even
though the ancestor, being insane, cannot assent. S. C. 133 Ind.
507. On assent see Stevens vs. Stevens, 148 N. W. 225 (Mich.)
In Mercier vs. Mercier, 59 Ga. 546, a father threatens a son with dis-
inheritance if he contracts a certain marriage. The propective heirs
of the father agree on equal division, whatever the will may be.
The agreement is held non-enforcible, on grounds of public policy.
10. Obviously, public policy is opposed to present alienation
of everything a person may acquire for the rest of his life. Theo-
retically, a restrictive line should be drawn somewhere. But at
common law, the technicalities as to transfer of future property
practically, if not theoretically, constitute an adequate barrier
against excessive present use of indefinite future property. While
expanding liberality as to such transfers, may in equity call for
restrictions in course -of time, the courts have as yet seen no necessity
for such action; and legislatures, though they have occasionally
restricted the power of conveying future property, in some separate
special situations, have nowhere attempted to lay down a general
rule. The history of the creation of future estates in realty suggests
an analogy. The rules of the common law, even though not for-
mulated for that purpose, effectually restricted the creation of
vested future estates. When, under the construction of the Statute
of Uses, it became possible to evade the common law technicalities
the courts met the situation with their rule against perpetuities.
III.
11. Coming now to the general problem of the transfer of
future property, unaffected by considerations of public policy
applicable to specific classes of cases, logically the matter must be
first examined as it arises between the original parties to the trans-
action. In litigation the questions are more apt to arise between
the transferee and some one claiming rights through the trans-
ferror, a subsequent purchaser, or a creditor of the transferror.
Here a distinct problem is superposed on that concerning the rela-
tion between the original parties; a problem that should be ap-
proached only after the original relation is settled.
Again, equity has acted on these problems only in compara-
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tively late times, whereas the common law view has been shaping
itself through centuries. So, in dealing with transfers of future
property, we first take up the subject as developed at common law,
ignoring the equitable view, and limit ourselves for the time to the
original parties, omitting intervening rights so far as they can be
eliminated.
12. At common law the view was that a transfer required
a transferror, a transferee, and a thing transferred. The three
were essential. If the subject matter did not exist at the time
of the transaction, its subsequent springing into existence could
not affect the situation as far as rights in and to that thing were
concerned. How far an action for damages might arise out of a
breach of such an agreement is beyond the scope of this inquiry,
which is limited to the rights in the future property itself.
This fine specimen of scholasticism came into sharp conflict
with practical human requirements at so early a period that the
first projected method of escape has all the irritating serio-comic
ingenuity of the original proposition. We are still laboring under
some of the effects of this chop-logic.
13. PotentialExistence. For the first case on the main avenue
of escape from the old common law on the subject, for the origin
of the doctrine of "potential existence" we are referred back to
21 Henry VI. (1443). The first generally accessible reported case
is Grantham vs. Hawley, Hobard 132 (1616). In that case a lessor
in a lease for twenty-one years covenanted that it should be lawful
for the lessee to take away such corn as may be growing on the
ground at the end of the term. The conveyance was upheld:
"Though the lessor had it not actually in him, nor certain, yet
he had it potentially, for the land is the mother and root of all
fruits. Therefore he that hath it may grant all fruits that may
arise upon it after, and the property shall pass as soon as the fruits
are extant. (21 Henry VI.) A person may grant all the tithe wool
that he shall have in such a year; yet perchance he shall have none;
but a man cannot grant all the wool that shall grow upon his sheep
that he shall buy thereafter, for there he hath it neither actually
nor potentially." The doctrine of potential existence has a firm
place in the law of today. In several situations the rule works
substantial justice; in others it fails to furnish the sensible solution.
Such practical considerations have naturally affected courts, it
would seem in part, at the expense of logical consistency. As to some
property, e.g., future crops, many courts still allow to the rule its
original force, as to some other property, it seems to be generally
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rejected. Again, what constitutes the potentiality out of which
the future property can issue is a matter in no little confusion,
independent tests being applied in the different classes of cases.
The rule is therefore most satisfactorily studied by first taking
up independent classes of situations in succession.
14. Future Crops. The doctrine of Grantham vs. Hawley
above cited, which makes an interest in the land from which the
crops are expected the source of the potentiality for the transfer
of such crops, of course permits transfer of an annual crop long be-
fore it is planted. This broad view is accepted without qualification
in England in Petch vs. Tuttin, 15 M. and W. 109 (1846), Alderson,
J. simply saying: "As to the question whether it" (an annual crop
planted long after the conveyance) "may pass by such deed, the
case cited from Hobart is quite decisive." Many cases in America
are in accord with this. As examples see Arques vs. Wasson, 51
Cal. 620, followed in Wilkinson vs. Thorp, 128 Cal. 221; Dickey
vs. Waldo, 97 Mich, 235; McCaffrey vs. Worden, 65 N. Y. 23; Briggs
vs. U. S. 143 U. S. 346 (354). But in many if not most states, the
Courts can no longer find the potentiality in the soil, but insist
that the contemplated crop must have been at least planted when
the transaction occurs. Rochester Distilling Co. vs. Rasey, 142
N. Y. 570; Appersen vs. Moon, 30 Ark. 56; Keysor vs. Maas, 111
Ala. 390. In several states statutes bring the law in practical
conformity to this theory. In Comstock vs. Sears, 7 Wis. 159, it is
not enough that the crop is planted; it must have sprouted. A
third group of cases concerning future crops which clearly call
for application of this theory of potential existence are decided by
the Courts on equitable principles as hereinafter discussed. In
some of these cases it is expressly said that such a transfer has no
standing at law. Brown vs. Nelson, 61 Nebr. 765;Kelly vs. Goodwin,
95 Me. 538. But even where nothing is said as to potential exis-
tence, the mere fact that it is ignoied makes such cases substantial
authorities for the repudiation of the whole theory. De Faughn
vs. Howell, 82 Ga. 336; Andrew vs. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417.
15. The well established principle that where by the agree-
ment the vendor is to do anything to the goods to put them into
a deliverable state, the performance of these things shall, in the
absence of circumstances indicating a contrary intention, be taken
to be a condition precedent to the vesting of the property, might
well seem to require consideration when dealing with these transfer
of future crops. The transferror ordinarily assumes the obligation
of caring for the crop till maturity. The principle is thus applied
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in Witter vs. Hill, 65 Minn. 273, where the transferee of a crop under
an agreement made before planting had to yield to a levy by a
judgment creditor of the transferror on the growing crop, the Court
holding that the title would not pass till the crop was threshed.
So the Court says in Cole vs. Kerr, 19 Nebr. 553: "Soil alone does
not produce crops in these degenerate days, if it ever did. It now
requires in addition to soil, seed and labor, both of man and beast."
But the argument is generally ignored in discussion of cases of
potential existence where the subject matter is merely a future
crop. Where, however, the subject of the agreement is some product
of a future crop, e.g., oil to be extracted by the transferror from
unplanted mint, the rule is applied, and the transferee is held to
have no interest in the property until the transferror has put the article
in deliverable shape. Langton vs. Higgins, 28 L. J. Ex. 252. But
in opposition to this, and against many authorities, and it would
seem against logic as well, in Van Hoozer vs. Cory, 35 Barb. 9, the
Court protected the lessor as to cheese made by the lessee on his
farm. The argument in this decision goes on lines of potential
existence.
16. Reservation of Title. Where the parties to the transaction
are landlord and tenant there are cases which uphold the land-
lord's right to future crops, when it is rested on a reservation there-
of made in the lease. The doctrine has no relation to that of po-
tential existence, and is parenthetically introduced here simply
because it rounds out the special case in hand of future crops. Under
this doctrine of reservation, the title to the crop never is in the
lessee; it is in the lessor to the exclusion of the lessee from the time
the seed is planted. De Vaughn vs. Howell, 82 Ga. 336; Andrews
vs. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417. It may be questioned whether such
a reservation is not void as conflicting with the grant. See Turner
vs. Bachelder, 17 Me. 257.
17. The Unborn Young of Domestic Animals. The doctrine
of potential existence has been applied to transactions as to colts
unborn. In Hull vs. Hull, 48 Conn. 250, 40 Am. R.. 165, the colt
in question was born a couple of years after the transaction, and
the decision turns on a discussion of potential existence. The
undiluted doctrine of Grantham vs. Hawley, supra, is applied. The
decision ignores, and on the facts of the case, rejects the analogy
suggested by the line of American cases as to future crops, requiring
the planting of the crop before the doctrine as to potentiality can
be invoked (Rochester Distilling Co. vs. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, and
other cases in Par. 14). See also in accord, Sawyer vs. Gerrish,
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70 Me. 254, and Walcott vs. Hamilton, 61 Vt. 79. But another line
of cases, alluding vaguely, if not disapprovingly, to the doctrine
of potential existence, makes the decision turn on reservation of
title, as discussed, with reference to future crops, in Par. 16. Under
this view the sale of the mare with reservation of the unborn colt,
leaves the title to the colt in the vendor. Andrew vs. Cox, 42 Ark.
473; Maize vs. Bowman, 93 Ky. 205. The vendor of the unborn
colt, thus reserving title, recovered against an innocent purchaser
of the colt after birth from the vendee in McCarty vs. Blevins, 5 Yerg.
195. So far as the case recognizes a legal title to the colt in the
original vendor as against his vendee, it calls for no comment; but
in rejecting the claims of the innocent purchaser even as against
the legal title, it involves principles to be discussed later, our view
for the present being limited to the relation between the original
parties.
18. Future Wages. It is not an uncommon transaction for
a wage earner to assign the wages for which he has as yet not ren-
dered services. The situation being considered here only as
between the parties to the transfer, i.e., the right of the assignee
to 'recover the wages when they mature as against the oppostion
of the assignor, no third claimant having intervened, the decisions
turn on the application of the doctrine of potential existence. The
test of potential existence however, is not the muscle skill or the
like of the wage earner as analogy to Grantham vs. Hawley would
suggest, but the source of potentiality is a subsisting employment,
and only what may be earned thereunder in the future can be
assigned. This calls to mind the "planted crop" cases cited ante
in Par. 14. But the rule is laxer as to wages than under the "planted
crop" theory. It is not necessary that the arrangement between
employer and employee should be broad enough to cover the period
for which the assignment is made. A subsisting relation of employer
and employee, terminable it may be at any time by either party,
or a current employment from month to month is a source of poten-
tiality adequate to sustain assignments of wages for as long as the
relation may be continued by the parties thereto. Mallin vs. Wen-
ham, 209 Ill. 252; Citizens Loan Co. vs. R. R. 196 Mass. 528; Chicago
etc., R. R. vs. Provolt, 42 Colo. 103; Wellborn vs. Buck, 114 Ala. 277;
Thayer vs. Kelly, 28 Vt. 19, 65 Am. Dec. 220; Metcalf vs. Kinkaid,
87 Iowa 443, 43 Am. St. R. 391; Angar vs. Bellvue Co., 39 Conn,
536. Where the assignor has no employment at the time, the
assignment is void, though wages described are thereafter earned.
Lehigh etc. R. R. vs. Woodring, 116 Pa. St. 513; Stronberg vs. Hill,
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170 Il. App. 323. In Minnesota the general doctrine as above
given is recognized with the restriction that an assignment of wages
to be earned without limit as to amount or time is void. Leitch vs.
R. R. 95 Minn. 35. This seems to be a matter of public policy rather
than a ruling as to potential existence.
19. Future earnings. The doctrine as to future wages does
not seem to be altered when the subject matter is broadened out
to include other forms of future earnings. Thus in Skipper vs.
Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 94 Am. Dec. 646, a physician assigned such
accounts against patients as might accrue to him for a number of
yeatrs. As the accounts involved in the litigation were not based
on relations existing between the physician and the patients at
the time of the transfer, it was held that they were not then in
potential existence, and so they did not pass. By the same test
a transfer of claims to become due to the transferror from time
to time as he performed his contract with a third person was upheld
in Buser vs. Bank, 167 Fed. Rep. 486. So, of an assignment of
profits or commissions to be derived from existing charter parties
Bank of Yolo vs. Bank of Woodland, 3 Cal. App. 561. See also
First National Bank vs. School District, 77 Nebr. 570; First National
Bank vs. Kimberlands, 16 W. Va. 555 (592); Johnson vs. Donohue
113 Tenn. 446; Spengler vs. Stiles, 94 Miss. 780; Brindge vs. Police
Association, 75 N. J. Eq. 405; St. Johns vs. Charles, 105 Mass. 262;
Godwin vs. Bank, 145 N. C. 320. Though it is thus possible for a
party to contract to assign whatever he is to earn under the con-
tract, it is of course impossible for him to transfer his obligation
so as to relieve himself of his duties under the contract, to the other
party thereto.
20. Conveyance of Future Additions and Substitutions. The
transfer of property may purport to include such other property
as may in the future be added to that described or substituted for
it. Practically the transaction only occurs in security transfers,
mortgages, or pledges. In Equity the assignment is upheld as
to the parties thereto. But at law the transferee acquires no right
as the property comes into existence.. No serious attempt seems
to have been made to stretch the doctrine of potential existence to
cover the situation. Such cases as may seem to suggest the idea
will be found to rest on a very different principle. A mortgage, like
any other transfer, gives the transferee the accretions to the thing
transferred, without need of specific provision in the mortgage.
A mortgage of realty covers subsequent improvements of the land;
a mortgage of a herd of cattle covers the calves subsequently born
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-[at least where the mortgage is held to give legal title (which
is all that concerns us here), Ellis vs. Reaves, 94 Tenn. 210; though
it may be otherwise where a mortgage is considered only a lien.
See Battle Creek Bank vs. First National Bank, 62 Nebr. 825, 56 L.
R. A. 124]. A mortgage of pickles in process of curing holds good
after they are "greened" and bottled, (Crosby vs. Baker, 88 Mass.
295); a mortgage of lumber in a factory covers the furniture made
out of it (Deherity vs. Paxon, 97 Ind. 253). In extension of this
doctrine it has been held that a mortgage of a printing press with
its appurtenances covered property after purchased to replace what
was worn out (Holly vs. Brown. 14 Conn. 255), and even that a mort-
gage of a railroad may cover a locomotive subsequently purchased
which is necessary for proper operation of the road. Morrill vs.
Noyes, 56 Me. 458, 96 Am. Dec. 486. But, as is specially stated'
in the last cited decision, the doctrine of potential existence is not
involved in these cases. Later cases have not sought to advance
by further stretching the doctrine that a mortgage covers property
in the form in which it may be subsequently modified, and rely
on the equitable principles for determination of rights under such
conveyances.
21. Transfer of Expectation. A transfer of an expectation,
as of the fish to be caught by the transferror on his next trip, raises
a somewhat close question as to application of this doctrine of
potential existence. In Jones vs. Webster, 48 Ala. 109, (112) it is
said: "A fisherman may sell the next cast of his net, because being
a fisherman, it is his business to have a net, and to cast it within
reasonable time. It is more than probable that he will do so."
This would seem a plausible application of the reasoning of Grantham
vs. Hawley. But the quoted remark is obiter in that case; and in
Low vs. ,Pew, 108 Mass. 347, which is directly in point, it is held,
on the narrower construction which seems the modern tendency
when the doctrine of potentiality is considered, that the transferror
had a mere possibility, and not an interest. The holding is the
same in Robinson vs. MacDonnell, 5 M. and W. 228. The case
must be distinguished from a seaman's assignment of the interest
in the catch which is to be taken by him in lieu of wages. Here,
though the consideration be uncertain, the subsisting agreement
for wages is held to furnish the requisite potentiality. Gardner vs.
Hoeg, 18 Pick. 168.
22. Conveyance of Chance to Inherit. The conveyance of
the prospective heir or devisee of a living person, when not against
public policy (ante Par. 9) has no standing in law, though upheld
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in equity, as will hereafter appear. The claim is held to be a mere
chance, and to have no "potential existence" under the rule we
are discussing. Authorities are collected in the note to McCall vs.
Hampton, 56 Am. St. R. 335, at page 442.
23. The Sales Act, Sec. 5 (3), provides "where the parties
purport to effect a present sale of future goods, the agreement
operates as a contract to sell the goods." This may abolish the
doctrine of potential existence, which gives the vendee rights as
to the goods, in sales of goods, wherever that act is in force.
24. Enurement of Title. Conveyances of future property are
supported on another ground, entirely distinct from the doctrine
of "potentiality," and of the reservation of title mentioned ante
Par. 16. It seems the prevailing doctrine in realty cases that if
the grantor in a warranty deed having no title or a defective one
at the time of the conveyance, thereafter acquires title, that title
as so acquired by the wairantor immediately passes to the grantee.
This principle is applied to a conveyance of realty by a prospective
heir in the ancestor's lifetime. Blackwell vs. Hamilton, 99 S. C. 264
(1914). The rule applies as to realty only where the conveyance
is a warranty deed or its equivalent under the local law. In sales
of personalty the law raises a warranty of good title. The principle
has been applied to sales of future personalty, where there was no
specific warranty beyond what the law implied, giving the vendee
title by inurement when the vendor subsequently acquired legal
title. Clark vs. Slaughter, 34 Miss. 65; Curran .'s. Bordsall, 20 Fed.
835; Watkins vs. Crenshaw, 59 M. A. 184; Frazer vs. Hilliard, 2
Strobh. 309. If the conveyance is void for reasons of public policy,
of course the warranty is of no avail. Such was the holding under
the Kentucky rule as to conveyances by prospective heirs (ante
Par. 9), in Spears vs. Spaw, 118 S. W. 275.
25. From all the foregoing it appears that the common law
general doctrine that there can be no conveyance of future property
as defined in Par. 2 has its limitations, even at law, when the title
is reserved (Par. 16), when it inures (Par. 24), and when the future
property has potential existence, as discussed above in various classes
of cases. Under reservation, the title never leaves the transferror;
under inurement, it passes to the transferee as soon as the trans-
ferror acquires title, and of course not before. Under the doctrine
of potential existence however, the transferee has something back
of the title at the time the property comes into existence. As
soon as the contract is made he has rights as to that property, as
yet non-existent, which are entitled to legal protection. For in-
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stance, the vendee or mortgagee of a crop, though it have not even
sprouted, is entitled to protection against devastation of the field
where it is planted.
IV.
26. So far we have considered from its common law side the
effect of an attempt to transfer future property as between the
parties, simply from the standpoint of the attempted transfer.
But further action may supervene, even when the transferee gets
no rights under the principle above discussed, and change the results.
Should for instance a transferror in such an abortive attempt to
transfer, actually deliver the property when it comes into existence,
to the transferee in pursuance of the prior understanding, the trans-
feree would obviously acquire the title of the transferror as between
them. But may not less suffice? May there not perhaps be situa-
tions where the transferee acquires title by himself, taking posses-
sion, as the property comes into existence, without action by the
transferror?
27. "An instrument which assumes to convey or encumber
a ,thing which has not even a potential existence must be regarded
as a mere executory contract. And whatever might be the status
of these contracts in courts of equity, where that is considered done
which ought to be done, it is well settled both in this country and
in England, that they do not create legal right to, or interest in,
the thing to which they relate, without what is called by the old
writers a new intervening act." Battle Creek Bank vs. First National
Bank, 62 Nebr. 825, 56 L. R. A. 124.
Since the new intervening pact must suffice to transfer the
title, it must derive its force from the owner, the transferror. No
act of the transferee not authorized by the transferror, can affect
the title to the thing'when it comes into existence. That title remains
in the transferror. Lunn vs. Thornton, 1 C. B. 379; Jones vs. Rich-
ardson, 10 Metc. 481. Most of the cases are on mortgages of after
acquired property, and the ruling is laid down that the mere acquisi-
tion of such property by the mortgagor is not enough: It must be
shown that it was done by the grantor "for the avowed object and
with the viefl of carrying the former grant or disposition into ef-
fect." Lunn vs. Thornton, supra; Griffith vs. Douglass, 73 Me.
532, 40 Am. R. 395.
28. Authority to Grantee to Seize. As was suggested in Lunn
vs. Thornton, and definitely ruled in Congreve vs. Evetts, 10 Exch.
298, if in the agreement the transferror gives the transferee the
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power to take the property when it comes into existence, then the
exercise by the transferee of this power, coming from the transferor
through the original agreement, vests title as between the parties.
Hope vs. Haley, 5 El. & B. 830; Carr vs. A.llatt, 3 Hurl & N. 964.
Cook vs. Corthell, 11 R. I. 482. Thompson vs. Foerstel, 10 M. A. 290;
Thompson vs. Fairbanks, 75 Vt. 361. As it is stated in Burrill vs.
W'hitcomb, 100 Me. 286( 295):" It is universally conceded that
possession taken by the mortgagee by virtue of the mortgagor's
consent given after the property is acquired, is to be deemed equiva-
lent to a voluntary delivery by the mortgagor, and such a 'new
act' as will effectuate the previous agreement. It has now been
shown by a uniform current of modern decisions, that the law has
advanced another step, and now holds that actual possesson of
such property taken by the mortgagee in the exercise of an authority
expressly granted in the mortgage, is also equivalent to a voluntary
delivery by the mortgagor, and if such possession is retained, it
makes the mortgagee's lien good as against an attaching creditor."
29. In cases where the transaction deals with future property
alone, there are decisions that construe this power in the transferee
as being a mere license. As such it is revocable at the transferror's
pleasure, at law. If the transferror does not revoke, the exercise
of the power gives the transferee a good title. Here the transferee
has no legal interest in the power, since he has no right at the time
of the agreement in the property. Chenoweth vs. Jenney, 10 Wis.
397.
30. But if, as is generally the case, the transferree has an in-
terest in the agreement; if, for instance, it includes a valid transfer
of existing property, the holdings are that the power is coupled with
an interest, and is therefore irrevocable. On this view the transferee
can take possession of the property after it has come into existence
and acquire good title against the opposition of the transferror.
McCaffery vs. JJ'oodin, 65 N. Y. 459; Leland vs. Collver, 34 Mich.
418 (424).
31. A growing line of cases seems to hold that the transferee
has the right to take future property as it comes into existence under
a mortgage that does not in terms give that right of seizure. A
mortgage "operates as an executory agreement that such goods
shall be holden by the mortgagee as security when acquired by the
mortgagor; and the mortgagee may take possession before the
rights of third persons intervene." W asserman vs. McDonnell,
190 Mass. 326. See Walker vs. Vaughan, 33rd Conn. 577. This
view, a practical reversal of Lunn vs. Thornton, furnishes a good
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illustration of the way in which the ideas of Equity gradually eat
into the old notions of Law.
32. In Reeves vs. Barlow, 12 Q. B. D. 436, the agreement pro-
vided that all building material brought by the intended lessee
on the lessor's land should become property of the latter. It was
held that the lessor had title to bricks brought on the land by the
intended lessee as soon as they were placed there without any further
act. To the same effect is Allen vs. Godnow, 71 Me. 424. Under
this view it would seem that the chief remaining distinction between
the legal and equitable view is that the former requires an express
agreement that the title to the future property shall vest in the
transferee at coming into existence; whereas the latter is ready to
imply such agreement from the nature of the transaction. It still
is true, however, that the titles continue respectively legal and
equitable, a matter of importance when intervening rights are under
consideration.
This attempt at a systematic outline for the study of transfers
of future property, after fixing the limits of the subject (Pars.1-3),
deals next with cases where some public policy prohibits transfer
of some special kind on grounds wholly alien to considerations con-
trolling the fundamental idea of transferring future property (Pars.
4-10). The refusal of the common law to recognize such transfers
of future property in general, has its exceptions which are next
taken up: The reservation of title (Par. 16) the enurement of
title (P. 24) and the doctrine of potential existence (Pars. 11-25).
Though the purported transfer be inadequate, subsequent events
may make the transferee's title good at law. This is the topic in
Pars. 26 to 32. A continuation of the outline would next deal with
the equitable view of such transfers; and finally (since the prior
discussion limits itself to rights as between transferror and trans-
feree), take up the rights of intervening third persons, e.g. creditors
of the transferror, or bona fide purchasers from him.
FRED. WISLIZENUS.
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